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ABSTRACT
METHODOLOGY TO PERFORM CYBER LETHALITY ASSESSMENT
Matthew W. Zurasky
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: John Adams

The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Lethality and
Effectiveness Branch is the Navy’s subject matter experts (SME) on target vulnerability, weapon
lethality, and weapon effectiveness. Branch personnel currently exercise expertise in the kinetic
and directed energy weapon domains. When the Navy develops weapons in the kinetic and
directed energy domains, there are clear and well established procedures and methodologies for
performing target characterization that support weapon-target pairing. Algorithms exist to
describe the likelihood of damage effects. It is natural that in the paradigm shift to cyberspace
warfare that the Branch provide these same services to the warfighter in the cyber domain. In
simplistic terms, cyberspace lethality is the opposite side of the cybersecurity coin. Rather than
protecting own-systems, a cyber-offensive capability is applied to an adversary’s network to
disrupt normal operations. However, there are currently no established procedures or
methodologies for performing cyberspace target vulnerability characterization (CTVC) or cyber
lethality and effectiveness analyses. Nor is there any organization currently dedicated to
performing these tasks. Previous efforts were conducted stand-alone and did not produce a
meaningful or accepted methodology. This dissertation is intended to research existing lethality
prediction processes for kinetic and directed energy weapons and modify them for the new cyber
weapon realm such that the new methodologies will allow analysts to perform effective and
efficient CTVC and cyber weapon lethality performance assessments. The methodology will be
presented to the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness for
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consideration and adaptation. The cyber lethality research and methodology development has
the support of NSWCDD management which has designated cyber warfare engineering to be a
thrust within the NSWCDD 2015-2020 Strategic Plan. This thrust includes providing support for
offensive cyber operations through the experimentation, development, test and evaluation,
training, integration, and certification of combat and weapon systems that will allow the naval
commander to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.
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This thesis is dedicated to the proposition that the quest for knowledge should never end.
Learning something outside one’s area of expertise can be especially satisfying.

"One's work may be finished someday, but one's education never."
-- Alexander Dumas
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NOMENCLATURE

CCB

Configuration Control Board

CTVC

Cyberspace Target Vulnerability Characterization

DMod

Data Modification

DRep

Data Repudiation

DoD

Department of Defense

DoS

Denial of Service

FALT

Failure Analysis Logic Tree

FMEA

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

HEL-RAPT

High Energy Laser Review Analysis and Process Team

ICS

Industrial Control System

IF

Integrated Fires

JMEM

Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

JTCG/ME

Joint Technology Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness

MisI

Misinformation

NSWCDD

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division

NIDR

Navy Information Dominance Roadmap

Pd/h

Probability of Damage given a Hit

PDeliv

Probability of Delivery

PExploit

Probability of Exploit

Ph

Probability of Hit

PIntel

Probability of Intelligence

PK

Probability of Kill

viii
Pk/d

Probability of a Kill given Damage

PK/H

Probability of Kill given a Hit

RCE

Remote Code Execution

SCADA

Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition

SME

Subject Matter Expert

TGM

Target Geometry Model
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CHAPTER 1
1. INTRODUCTION
The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) Lethality and
Effectiveness Branch is the Navy’s subject matter expert (SME) on threat vulnerability, weapon
lethality, and weapon effectiveness. Branch personnel demonstrate expertise in the kinetic and
directed energy weapon domains. The Lethality and Effectiveness Branch ensures that
warfighters employ effective weapons by providing decision-makers with objective technical
assessments of engagement options. The mission is accomplished through the application of four
core capabilities:
•

The ability to quantify the performance of complex weapon systems,

•

The ability to define & exploit the threat,

•

The ability to capture the dynamics of weapon/threat interaction in mathematically
tractable models, and

•

The ability to perform first principles numerical calculations (Zurasky, 2015).

1.1 Purpose
It is natural that in the paradigm shift to cyberspace warfare that the Branch provide these
same services to the warfighter in the cyber domain. However, there are currently no established
procedures or methodologies for performing cyberspace target vulnerability characterization
(CTVC) or cyber lethality and effectiveness analyses. Nor is there any organization currently
dedicated to performing these tasks. NSWCDD must close this capability gap to keep pace with
new technology development. The Branch finds itself in the same situation that the French
Committee of Artillery reported to their Minister of War in 1800: “Ici il n’est pas question de
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changer, il faut créer [Here there is no question of changing, it is necessary to create]” (Dahlgren,
1852).

1.2 Problem
This dissertation is intended to research and adapt existing lethality prediction processes for
kinetic and directed energy weapons to the new cyber weapon realm such that the new
methodologies will allow analysts to perform effective and efficient CTVC and cyber weapon
lethality performance assessments. This dissertation will propose a methodology to bridge the
capability gap while meeting the security and data distribution requirements imposed by the
Navy and the Department of Defense.

1.3 Method and Procedure
This dissertation is developed from unclassified public sources and public release
information from government sources. This will limit some of the details available to describe
the methodology, but it has the benefit of eliminating any concerns relative to security or
releasability of the information. Also, this paper refers to a “cyber target” and a “cyber threat”
interchangeably. Both of these terms refer to the adversarial system that is to be exploited by the
cyber weapon.
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CHAPTER 2
2. BACKGROUND / HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

2.1 Literature Review
Military mission planners rely upon validated weapon and target information to
determine the probability of success for mission scenarios. A process exists within the
Department of Defense to match kinetic weapons to targets so that an optimum solution can be
selected. A similar process for cyber weapons is necessary or the United States military will
cede this aspect of warfare to adversarial parties; combatant commanders will not utilize cyber
warfare without knowing the effects it will produce or the potential collateral damage that may
occur.
There is limited academic or professional literature relating to the assessment of cyber
weapon lethality. A few companies have performed studies at the behest of the U.S.
Government but these efforts are classified and are not releasable in this forum. Others have
documented aspects of the cyber defense perspective.
Joint Publication 3-12(R) (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013) provides the military’s
doctrine regarding the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of joint cyberspace
operations. This document introduces cyberspace and its integration across the range of military
operations. The doctrine describes three layers of cyberspace, as shown in Figure 1: the
physical network layer, the logical network layer, and the social (cyber-persona) network layer.
The document also discusses roles and responsibilities relating to the planning and coordination
of cyberspace operations.
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Figure 1 Cyber Domains
Some activities have developed schemas and nomenclature to describe characteristics of
malware and other cyber capabilities. The Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization
(MAECTM) language developed by the Mitre Corporation is one example of this (Beck, Kirillov,
& Chase, 2014). Mitre also developed the Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator
Information (TAXIITM) framework that defines a set of message exchanges and services to share
information (Connolly, Davidson, & Schmidt, 2014). Using its kill-chain model, Lockheed
Martin describes the phases of intrusions and indicators that may identify patterns of an
advanced persistent threat (Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2014). These authors propose an
intelligence feedback loop to decrease an adversary’s likelihood of success with each subsequent
intrusion attempt. This is a precursor to predicting cyber weapon performance.
The U.S. Army Cyber Command tasked the RAND Corporation to study and develop a
strategy for providing cyber support to units at the Army corps level and below (RAND
Corporation, 2017). The resulting document describes the overarching goals, objectives, and
associated activities for these forces. Part of this strategy describes what the Army needs to do to
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implement an overall vision for tactical cyber operations. In addition, the report discusses the
potential incorporation and use of offensive cyber operations, specifically at the tactical level.
However, without a standardized and accepted methodology to predict cyber weapon
performance, cyber capability will not be released to the corps or equivalent level and will
remain limited in its applications to strategic targets.

2.2 Development of Weapons and Systematic Analyses
Mankind has developed and utilized weapons since the earliest recorded history. Ancient
cave and rock drawings show humans using spears and bows for hunting. Over time, stone and
wood were replaced with metals such as copper, bronze, and iron. Eventually gunpowder was
invented and kinetic weapons using lead, iron, and steel shot became commonplace.
Accordingly, critical scientific methods have been applied to the development of kinetic
weapons. Analyses of threat systems characteristics and the calculations of interactions between
kinetic weapon systems and threat systems have been conducted for many years. Benjamin
Robins published his New Principles of Gunnery in 1742. In it he expressed mathematical
equations to describe factors such as the effects of air resistance on projectiles. He also noted
that the penetration depth achieved by musket balls appeared to be a function of the ratios of the
square of their velocities (Collins).
The United States followed European practices and established schools and curriculums
for military sciences. At the insistence of President Washington, Congress in 1794 authorized
the establishment of a "Corps of Artillerist and Engineers" at West Point, New York. No formal
course of study was adopted, so President Thomas Jefferson proposed and signed legislation on
16 March 1802 establishing that a Corps of Engineers "… shall be stationed at West Point and
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constitute a Military Academy …" to focus on science and engineering (Ambrose, 1999).
Likewise, in 1825, President John Quincy Adams asked Congress to establish a Naval Academy
"for the formation of scientific and accomplished officers." His proposal, however, was not
acted upon until 20 years later when, through the efforts of the Secretary of the Navy George
Bancroft, the Naval School was established without Congressional funding. The curriculum for
the initial class of 50 midshipmen included mathematics, navigation, gunnery, and steam. In
1850 Congress authorized the Naval School to become the United States Naval Academy (U.S.
Navy).
In addition to having separate methods and academies to train officers, up until the postWorld War II era and the establishment of the Department of Defense (DoD), the War
Department and the Department of the Navy handled their business separately. For the Navy,
the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography was established by Congress in 1842 to develop new
weapons and ordnance materiel, to improve existing items, and, in wartime, to oversee largescale production and procurement of such equipment. In 1862 the Bureau was divided into
separate commands as the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Navigation. The first Chief of
the Bureau of Ordnance, Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, played a significant role in the
development of naval gunnery. First in the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, and then as
the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Admiral Dahlgren applied scientific methods to become
the “father of modern naval ordnance” (U.S. Navy). In doing so, Admiral Dahlgren became an
ordnance expert, developed a percussion lock, and wrote a number of books, including The
System of Boat Armaments in the United States Navy, Shells and Shell Guns, and Naval
Percussion Locks and Primers. Under his command, the Navy established its own foundry to
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manufacture new equipment. Its first product was the boat howitzer, designed for use aboard
ships and in landings.
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, named for Rear Admiral
Dahlgren, has been at the forefront of performing these types of analyses for nearly one hundred
years. Figure 2 illustrates an early lethality test performed at Dahlgren in 1922. Test data today
is used to develop high fidelity and engineering level models that are engaged to determine
probability of occurrences of lethal and non-lethal events.
Eventually, Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara saw the benefit of standardized
practices across all the military services and established the tri-service Joint Technical
Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME). Currently, NSWCDD is a leading
Navy participant in the JTCG/ME and is actively improving vulnerability, lethality, and
effectiveness simulation models.

Figure 2 Lethality Test Performed at Naval Proving Grounds Dahlgren in 1922

2.3 Tri-Service Systematic Processes for Kinetic and Directed Energy Weapons
The JTCG/ME was established in 1964 to provide warfighters, operational commanders,
DoD targeteers, weaponeers, planners, weapon system designers, and logisticians with the most
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current and accurate non-nuclear weapons effectiveness data. JTCG/ME is a tri-service
organization whose approved data is available to authorized personnel. Since the 1960’s the
JTCG/ME has governed a standardized process that is accepted by all three services within the
DoD. The standardized process outlines common test data collection practices and modeling
methodologies. The principal products of the JTCG/ME are known as the Joint Munitions
Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs). The JMEM information includes damage/kill probabilities for
specific weapons and threats, physical and functional characteristics of munitions and weapon
systems, threat vulnerability, obscuration on weapon effectiveness, and analytical techniques and
procedures for assessing munitions effectiveness (U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis
Activity, 2016). The JMEMs were developed to provide a set of data developed with known
methodologies that would permit a standardized comparison of weapon effectiveness across all
three service communities (Driels M.). Combatant commanders and mission planners in the
field can use the JMEM information to determine the best combination of weapon ordnance and
tactics to attack and render inoperable enemy systems and structures.
The JTCG/ME has recently adapted its standard kinetic energy threat vulnerability
characterization process to directed energy weapons through the High Energy Laser Review
Analysis and Process Team (HEL-RAPT) efforts. The current JTCG/ME kinetic and laser
processes determine the vulnerability of threat platforms, weapons, and infrastructure, predict the
ability of an ordnance package to inflict damage to a threat, and measure the ability of a weapon
to engage and inflict damage given the performance and environmental conditions. Thus, field
commanders have the ability to pair both kinetic and directed energy weapons to threats.
The JTCG/ME process has evolved to reflect the increased capabilities of models and
computational systems. However, newer methodologies continue to use foundational principles
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that are now well established. For example, the following definitions have been established and
are accepted in the vulnerability/lethality community (Zurasky, 2015):
•

Vulnerability – the characteristic of a threat that causes it to suffer functional
degradation as a result of manmade damage (Threat Vulnerability)

•

Lethality – the ability of a munition to inflict damage on a threat sufficient to cause
functional degradation in its ability to complete its designated mission(s) (Weapon
Lethality)

•

Effectiveness – the overall ability of a weapon system to engage and inflict damage
on a vehicle sufficient to cause functional degradation (Weapon System
Effectiveness).

2.4 Systematic Analyses for Electronic Warfare and Psychological Operations
The kinetic and directed energy weapons that physically damage an incoming threat –
and thereby destroying/altering its payload/warhead or propulsion in such a way that the
intended effect on the threat is severely impeded – are designated as hard-kill measures.
Electronic warfare is the military action that involves the use of electromagnetic energy
to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action
that retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum (Frieden, 1985). Psychological
operations are “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior
of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's
objectives” (Naef, 2011). Electronic warfare and psychological operations are designated soft-
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kill measures. These methods are more dependent upon outside influences than kinetic and
directed energy weapons to be effective. They also have a more difficult time predicting and
evaluating performance.
Most stakeholders in the military environment (warfighters, acquisition professionals,
Congressional staffers) understand the contributions of hard-kill measures against materiel. That
is, while they may not be able to quantify the exact tonnage of bombs or missiles to destroy a
threat, they certainly understand that bombs and missiles can be used to destroy materiel threats.
However, there is a lack of shared knowledge relative to soft-kill methods such as electronic
warfare and psychological operations. This leads to pressure to provide more thoughtful and
explicit documentation to decision makers. While there is a burden to develop and provide the
increased information to decision makers, there can be significant benefits for future soft-kill
measures. An improved shared understanding of the return on investment can potentially
improve advocacy for these efforts and also improve the efforts themselves by imposing more
rigorous assessments (Paul, Yeats, Clarke, Matthews, & Skrabala, 2015).
For electronic warfare, mission planners attempt to qualitatively predict its effectiveness.
The electronic warfare contribution is required to be effective at a particular time and location.
However, the electronic warfare contribution is currently not very well quantified; instead it is
predicted to be non-existent, fair, or potentially likely to be effective. For this reason it is often
considered to be an ancillary contributor and so is not counted upon for mission planning
purposes.
Psychological operations are often unconstrained by a particular location or time element.
Although psychological operations should include a time horizon for their completion, changing
behaviors can require significant investments in time and resources. Thus, due to the long-term
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nature, many psychological operations do not lend themselves to intermediate or periodic
progress measurements (Paul, Yeats, Clarke, Matthews, & Skrabala, 2015).

2.5 Required Evolution to Assess Cyber Weapons
In just a few decades, the Navy moved from a fleet of sail and steam-powered ships to a
high-tech fleet with nuclear-powered vessels (submarines and surface ships) and supersonic
aircrafts. The service is now undergoing another significant change to adopt cyberspace as a
new warfighting domain. Others have recognized this situation. Israeli Major General Aviv
Kochavi has stated that cyber warfare “will soon be revealed to be the biggest revolution in
warfare, more than gunpowder and the utilization of air power in the last century” (United Press
International, 2014).
The January 2012 announcement by the DoD that it plans to enable the U.S. military to
conduct a “combined arms campaign across all domains – land, air, maritime, space, and
cyberspace” makes it clear that we are moving past the time of strictly using kinetic weapons
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). The Navy Information Dominance Roadmap for 20132028 emphasizes that Navy Integrated Fires (IF) will coordinate all elements within the blue kill
chain and disrupt adversary kill chains. This will allow U.S. Naval forces to seize and hold the
initiative in combat and to limit an enemy’s freedom of maneuver and action. The Roadmap
states that IF will require new capabilities to fully employ integrated information in warfare by
expanding the use of offensive cyber effects to complement existing and planned kinetic
weapons within the battlespace (U.S. Navy, 2013).
Cyber lethality finds itself in a situation similar to the soft-kill weapons; most DoD
stakeholders do not have an intrinsic understanding of the process or potential outcomes of cyber
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weapons. Therefore, it is imperative that commanders be given a measure of the predicted
performance of cyberspace weapons. Without this commanders won’t be able to properly weigh
the benefit of offensive cyberspace capabilities.
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CHAPTER 3
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Assigning a Methodology to Cyber Lethality
As reported by The Economist magazine, a senior defense official implied that cyber
weapons will be used as an adjunct to conventional weapons and noted that “if a cyber attack is
to be used as a military weapon, you want a predictable time and effect” (War in the fifth
domain, 2010). More recently, the Defense Science Board presented a new report on cyber
deterrence to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. The report proposes the accelerated
acquisition of scalable offensive capabilities. These are in line with the desires of U.S. Cyber
Command head Admiral Michael Rogers who wants to structure Cyber Command teams much
more like special operations forces and give local commanders more license to use offensive
cyber weapons (Tucker, 2017). Obviously, a predictable effect necessitates an efficient and
appropriate cyber lethality prediction methodology.
As in the case for kinetic weapons, the objectives of a cyber weapon lethality and
effectiveness prediction process are to promote consistency and improve weapon system
evaluation accuracy across DoD. Without a proper assessment and prediction process,
commanders will remain reluctant to employ cyber weapons. Consistency is implemented
through a common set of definitions and assumptions that are used by each of the Services to
produce weapon system performance estimates. This commonality ensures that significant
differences, if any, are attributable to the weapon system and threat characteristics rather than the
methods employed by the individual Services. Also, standardization facilitates a common
interpretation and meaningful comparison of weapon system performance. Thus, the predictions
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delivered by a cyber effectiveness analysis are likely to be accepted by the warfighting
community.
Given the various effects capable to be enacted by cyber weapons, the lethality and
effectiveness prediction methodology must be robust enough to be tailored to suit each particular
analysis. That means there must be some common structure that gives the analyst leeway to
develop assessments against threats and for kill effects not yet encountered.

3.2 Existing Process to Assess Kinetic Weapons
The process established to assess kinetic weapons has been long established and
understood by the tri-service lethality and effectiveness community. The process allows an
analyst to assess the physical interactions between ordnance and the threat and to determine if
the resulting damage is sufficient to negate the threat’s mission. There are multiple steps to the
process.
Once a threat system is identified the analyst must collect intelligence on the threat and
identify critical system elements. Using a standardized format, a Threat Geometry Model
(TGM) is created to show the physical interconnectivities of components and, if appropriate, the
significant crew members. A critical systems analysis is developed to illustrate the functional
connections. Once a desired kill level is associated with the threat, a Failure Analysis Logic Tree
(FALT) for the system components is developed to indicate which components factor into
damage effects. A typical FALT structure is illustrated in Figure 3. A Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) follows to link particular damaged components to functional
degradations.
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Figure 3 Typical Failure Analysis Logic Tree (FALT)

Component vulnerabilities are estimated based upon test data, computational physics
hydrocode analyses, or engineering level analyses. Most component vulnerability inputs are
generated using engineering level analysis. Examples include:
•

Penetration equations/program with a spreadsheet, and

•

Specialized algorithms (e.g., Jacobs-Roslund equation for explosive detonation)
(Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 2014).

An example graph of component fragility curves (also known as probability of damage
curves) is shown in Figure 4. It shows that given a force of x the component designated with the
yellow curve will be damaged with a higher probability than the components designated by the
red and blue curves.
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Figure 4 Example Fragility Curves
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Once the TGM has been constructed and the fragility of components estimated, the threat
vulnerability process is completed. The second part of the JTCG/ME process pertains to
characterizing U.S. weapons. This is done using standard data collection methods appropriate to
the weapon effects type. For fragmentation weapons, data is collected for fragment masses,
shape, velocities, and material. The data is saved in a zonal data (“z-data”) file. For blast
weapons, a Comp B or TNT equivalent explosive charge weight is determined. Penetration data
is collected for projectiles and shaped charge devices. Lastly, for laser weapons, propagation
and irradiance on the threat is calculated using engineering-level simulation codes that utilize the
expected engagement geometry and the TGM information.
Given the completed vulnerability assessment and the weapon characteristics, an analyst
can pair the threat with a weapon and perform a lethality estimate. This estimate provides a
probability of kill given a hit (PK/H) on the threat and is dependent upon the munition
characteristics, the threat vulnerability, the kill definition criteria, the velocity and orientation at
impact. Driels provides examples of kill definitions as shown in Table 1 (Driels M. R., 2013).

Table 1 Examples of Kill Definitions
Target Type

Kill Definitions

Land Vehicles

K – catastrophic kill (not repairable)
M0 – mobility kill (cannot move, immediately
M40 – mobility kill (cannot move within 40 minutes)
F – firepower kill (cannot fire)
PTO – repairs requiring at least 5 minutes
PTO4 – repairs requiring at least 4 hours
PTO24 – repairs requiring at least 24 hours
Defense (prevent) within 30 seconds
Assault (prevent) within 30 seconds
Assault (prevent) within 5 minutes
Supply (prevent) within 12 hours

Parked Aircraft

Personnel (standing)
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For a typical lethality estimate, each point on threat is assigned a single shot PK/H. The
calculations at each point include penetration, blast, and fragmentation effects. The results are
illustrated in an image called a “vulnagram” to highlight the best aimpoints for maximum effects.
A sample vulnagram is shown in Figure 5 (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division,
2014).

Figure 5 Vulnagram of a Small Boat Threat

The effectiveness of a weapon is defined as the Probability of Kill (PK) and is the product
of many probabilities. Often the equation is truncated to PK = Ph * (Pd/h * Pk/d) because the
analyst assumes that prior events occurred to position the kinetic weapon at the intersect point.
Ph is the accuracy term and (Pd/h * Pk/d) is the lethality term (equivalent to PK|H in the previous
paragraph. Simulation codes such as Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model and Effectiveness
ToolBox calculate these terms. Figure 6 illustrates a typical effectiveness equation for a missile
intercept event (Zurasky, 2015). For the most part, all of the probabilities to the left of the endgame values (Ph, Pd/h, and Pk/d) are nearly equivalent to one. The true variability is associated
with the warhead interactions.
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Figure 6 Kinetic System Effectiveness Kill Chain

3.3 Inherent Differences Between Cyber Weapons and Kinetic Weapons
Weapons can impart damage to threats in several ways. Kinetic weapons cause damage
through physical means such as blast, fragment penetration, and heat effects. Kinetic weapons
are effective when the damage caused to the threat results in the failure of critical components.
Cyber weapons do not interact physically with threats; rather, they manipulate software to
achieve effects.
A high explosive blast warhead is designed to achieve damage through overpressure
effects. Upon detonation, the high explosive material converts to a gas at extremely high
pressure and temperature. The pressure of the expanding gas fractures the weapon case and
allows the gas to escape. The air surrounding the case is then compressed and a blast (shock)
wave is transmitted through it. Blast weapons are particularly effective against buildings and
personnel in the open. This is because when a threat is exposed to a blast wave, it will
experience the overpressure and under-pressure effects. The internal cavities on insufficiently
reinforced bodies reflect and amplify the blast wave. This causes injuries in the lungs,
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gastrointestinal tract, and ears in humans and damage in equipment compartments and manned
spaces in buildings and vehicles.
Fragmenting weapons and projectiles both operate on the same premise: masses
accelerated to great velocities impacting and penetrating materials. In the case of a fragmenting
warhead, hundreds of naturally-forming or scored fragments are ejected from the explosion in
the path or proximity of the threat. A certain number of the fragments intersect and penetrate the
body of the threat. The depth and volume of the penetration is dependent upon the mass of the
fragment and its impact velocity. Similarly, a projectile penetrates material by exerting extreme
force on a point-like small area on the threat. Its depth of penetration is again dependent upon
the mass of the projectile. The effectiveness of a fragmenting or projectile weapon depends upon
its ability to penetrate and damage a critical component.
Laser weapons focus a concentrated beam of visible or invisible light at a point on a
threat. This light energy is absorbed by the intercepting body and converted to heat. The
temperature increase of the material causes its weakening and deformations. Given enough
heating, material may melt away and expose internal components. Burning occurs if the
temperature exceeds the material’s ignition point.
Kinetic weapons interact physically with threats in accordance with the laws of physics.
For example, as shown in Figure 7, a blast wave appears as a rapid rise from ambient to a peak
pressure point which is followed by an exponential decay to a value below ambient. It then
returns to the ambient condition. The penetration of fragments or projectiles follow Newton’s
Second Law of Motion and requires the weapon to overcome the resistive force of the threat
material (Zook, 1977). Lastly, the irradiance of a laser on a threat is dependent upon the output
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power, atmospheric attenuation, and beam quality characteristics such as beam width and
divergence.

Blast Wave Form
80
60
40
20
0
-20

Figure 7 Pressure-Time Profile of a Blast Wave

Cyber weapons allow practitioners to compromise computers and processors by
identifying important data to manipulate, steal, or destroy. Cyber weapon penetration into a
system is not achieved physically. Instead, cyber weapons leverage inter-computer protocols to
gain access to threat computers. Some cyber weapons engage networking and administrative
tools to probe and map networks and to conduct lateral movements across networks. Other cyber
weapons actually manipulate the computer code to alter the output of algorithms. These cyber
weapons, however, do not directly rely upon the laws of physics to inflict damage. That is,
weaponized code does not come with an explosive charge. Potential physical damage must be
created by the targeted system itself through stopping or altering ongoing processes (Rid &
McBurney, Cyber-Weapons, 2012).
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3.4 Initial Proposed Process to Assess Cyber Weapons
Similar to kinetic weapon assessments, a cyber lethality methodology must include the
following:
•

Identification and definition of cyber kill effects,

•

Cyber threat vulnerability assessment,

•

Cyber weapon characterization, and

•

Cyber lethality estimate generation.

Identification and Definition of Cyber Kill Effects
The first element of the common structure is a common set of kill criteria. In some cases,
a cyber weapon may enact effects that cause physical damage similar to a kinetic weapon. For
example, a cyber weapon that causes a servo controller to turn off will induce the same failures
to a flight system as those caused by a penetrating projectile damaging the same servo controller.
The existing definitions for mobility kill and firepower kill still apply to cyber weapons
for those effects that cause physical damage. Mobility kills are those where the damage or effect
is sufficient to render a platform incapable of executing controlled movement within the time
interval being assessed. Firepower kills are those where the damage or effect is sufficient to
render the threat immediately incapable of engaging its weapon. On the other hand, cyber
weapons do not appear to contribute to Crew kills. Crew kills are those where injury or effects
to the crew are such that they are incapacitated and enough crewmembers are incapacitated such
that the threat’s mission cannot be accomplished.
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However, the added variation in cyber effects makes the prediction of cyber weapon
effectiveness problematic. The outcomes of some of these effects do not directly correspond to
existing kinetic weapon kill definitions. Cyber-specific kill effects include:
•

Denial of Service – computer or network resources are made unavailable to intended
users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the
Internet

•

Misinformation – false or incorrect information is spread intentionally

•

Data Modification – data is inserted, deleted, or altered in a manner that is intended to
appear genuine to the user

•

Data Repudiation – data or information is made to appear to be invalid or misleading

•

Spoofing – an attempt to masquerade as someone else

•

Network Enumeration – usernames and info on groups, shares, and services of
networked computers are retrieved

These need to have quantifiable metrics associated with them. They need to have a time
associated with the initial effect and they need to have an associated duration period. The
following are initial proposals; completed definitions will have to be reviewed and accepted at
the tri-service level. Note that some cyber effects have a lasting effect. That is, the effect
continues to exist until a corrective action is taken by the adversary.
•

Denial of Service –
o Kill/Effect: damage or effect to the threat system resulting in its disruption of
service
o Time Start: immediate
o Time Duration: 5 minutes (DoS), four hours (DoS4), or 24 hours (DoS24)
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•

Misinformation –
o Kill/Effect: false or incorrect information is spread intentionally
o Time Start: immediate
o Time Duration: 5 minutes (MisI), four hours (MisI4), or 24 hours (MisI24)

•

Data Modification –
o Kill/Effect: data is successfully inserted, deleted, or altered in a manner that
is intended to appear genuine to the adversary
o Time Start: immediate
o Time Duration: 5 minutes (DMod), four hours (DMod 4), or 24 hours (DMod
24)

•

Data Repudiation –
o Kill/Effect: data or information is successfully made to appear to be invalid
or misleading
o Time Start: immediate
o Time Duration: 5 minutes (DRep), four hours (DRep 4), or 24 hours (DRep
24)

•

Spoofing –
o Kill/Effect: successfully masquerading as someone else
o Time Start: immediate
o Time Duration: indeterminate

•

Network Enumeration –
o Kill/Effect: successfully retrieving usernames and info on groups, shares, and
services of networked computers
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o Time Start: immediate
o Time Duration: indeterminate
It is important to note that Misinformation and Repudiation must provide the adversary
with the proper balance of belief and disbelief. Libicki writes that prior beliefs or opinions drive
how users interpret information. Users are more likely to believe something to be true if it
supports their prior thoughts. This is especially true when they rely upon their beliefs and fail to
research the information that is presented (Libicki, 2007).
Other cyber effects are likely to be added in the future. However, these are sufficient to
develop a general methodology.

Cyber Threat Vulnerability Assessment
Similar to kinetic weapon assessments, a multi-phase cyber lethality threat vulnerability
assessment must include the following: (1) selection of the threat, (2) definition of the system
boundaries and identification of critical components, and (3) identification of component
vulnerabilities. Figure 8 illustrates a typical network diagram with firewalls and an intrusion
detection system. These are typical system components which must be described. Any such
network may also include wifi and smart phones. Other example networks include Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for remote monitoring and control and
dedicated military systems with stand-alone dedicated processors.
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Figure 8 Typical Network Diagram

In Phase 1, the analyst will identify the threat and begin to gather baseline information.
This will include a brief description of the threat, relevant photos or schematic drawings, top
level FALTs, and a list of assumptions pertinent to the analysis. It is important to recognize that
the complexity of the threat will affect the type and amount of information available. Is it a
multi-faceted system with numerous nodes or is it a distinct element like a cell phone or a
website? Is it is a commercially available product like a communications center or is it a limitedaccess product like a military radar system? If it is a limited-access product, does it include
commercial components? Are specifications widely available? Can failures in the threat system
be easily determined?
In Phase 2, the analyst will begin to develop a threat model to include a detailed
description of the threat, a network model (if appropriate), a detailed FALT, and a FMEA. For a
cyber evaluation, the physical components of the threat are less significant. Instead, the software
code and its functional elements are the items to be evaluated. The system boundaries are
important when developing the network model. Too broad of a system boundary leads to an
overly complex system definition; too narrow of a boundary may exclude key elements that are
affected by the weapon. The key aspect of Phase 2 is the FMEA. It identifies the critical
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functional elements and the conditions that need to be altered in order to change the state of the
threat system and achieve the desired effect. For example, the FMEA can identify a servo
controller as a single point failure node. A well-designed cyber weapon can then alter the state
of the servo causing loss of system control.
When determining the boundaries of the threat, the question may be raised: should the
network path be considered part of the cyber threat characterization or is it part of the cyber
weapon characterization since the weapon cannot exist without the network? Or is it part of the
environment, merely the medium through which the weapon travels to its targeted threat? This
author holds the position that the network path is independent of both the threat and the weapon
but it is important because it enables the access points associated with the threat.
In Phase 3, the analyst will identify the vulnerability of the identified critical cyber
components. The vulnerability can be considered a flaw in the software or environment that can
be exploited. Identified flaws without an exploitation path are not vulnerabilities; they are
merely design weaknesses. Vulnerabilities can exist in the threat system design, within installed
software, within its network configuration, or be associated with its business operations. Some
known vulnerabilities include (Sood & Enbody, 2014):
•

Backdoors and Hardcoded Passwords – hardcoded passwords embedded in the
firmware that allow attackers who discover them to gain complete access to these
systems;

•

Remote Code Execution (RCE) – security issues such as buffer overflows (stack,
heap, and integer), use-after free errors, race conditions, memory corruption, privilege
escalations, dangling pointers in operating system components, browsers, critical
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systems such as ICS/SCADA, routers, other software such as Microsoft Office,
Adobe Reader, Java, etc.;
•

Insecure Protocols, Spoofing and Hijacking – undocumented and insecure protocols
allow hijacking and spoofing of communication channels

•

SQL Injections – weaknesses in web applications that allow attackers’ queries to be
executed directly in the backend database; and

•

Insecure Authentication and File Uploading Flaws – security issues arising from
inability of the systems to implement granular control through proper authentication
and authorization checks.

Sood and Enbody list real-world cases associated with these vulnerabilities. These are
summarized in Table 2.

Table 2 Significant Cyber Vulnerabilities and Real-World Cases
Vulnerability Types

Real World Cases – Vulnerable Systems

Backdoors and Hardcoded
Passwords

• Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite Communication
(SATCOM) systems provided by Harris, Cobham, JRC,
Iridium and Hughes were vulnerable
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
(SCADA) provided by Siemens, TURCK, etc. were
vulnerable
• Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite Communication
(SATCOM) systems provided by Harris, Cobham, JRC,
Iridium and Hughes were vulnerable
• SCADA systems provided by ICONICS GENESIS32,
BizViz, IntegraXor, Sielco Sistemi, etc. were vulnerable to
Buffer Overflows
• XMLDOM Zero-day vulnerability was exploited to attack
U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’ website
• Operation Pawn Storm uses vulnerabilities in MS office
files to target U.S. military officials
• Royal Navy website hacked using SQL Injection
• U.S. Army website hacked using SQL Injection
• Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite Communication
(SATCOM) systems provided by Harris, Cobham, JRC,
Iridium and Hughes were vulnerable
• Possible attacks to spoof GPS communication to control
U.S. drones

Insecure Authentication
and File Uploading
Remote Code Execution

SQL Injections
Insecure Protocols,
Spoofing and Hijacking
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All of the various cyber components must be listed with their associated vulnerabilities.
This will provide the cyber weapon designer with a complete description – equivalent to the
kinetic weapon Threat Geometry Model – against which to choose the most appropriate available
cyber capability to cause damage.

Cyber Weapon Characterization
As described in Chapter 2, a cyber weapon is a software capability by which an attacker
exploits vulnerabilities within a targeted system to cause damage. None of the kinetic weapon
characteristics apply: items such as warhead fragmentation and blast overpressure data,
guidance methods, fuze functions, and reliability. Instead, new characteristics will have to be
developed. These should be categorized according to cyber weapon’s functional responsibilities:
Reconnaissance, Lateral Movement, and Payload.
In order to penetrate and exploit an adversarial network, like the one illustrated in
Figure 8, some aspect of the cyber weapon will require networking reconnaissance tools to map
out the threat network, to probe potential avenues, and to monitor activity. The weapon will be
required to locate the desired target components and identify ways to get to them. By utilizing
host and port scan applications to map out the network resources, the weapon will develop an
inventory of relevant target components. The reconnaissance characterization should include
descriptions of its function and the operational environment in which it operates. Based upon a
2016 analysis of attack behaviors, the ten most popular networking and hacking reconnaissance
tools are provided by Table 3. This report also notes that 99% of reconnaissance and lateral
movement threats originated from legitimate applications or from riskware (software whose
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installation and execution poses a potential yet not definite risk to a host computer); only 1%
originated from malware (Lightcyber, 2016).
Once the target system has been successfully penetrated, the cyber weapon will have to
extend across the network to the vulnerable component. It will do so by using lateral movement
applications. Lateral movement allows the attacker to maintain persistence in the network, gain
control of the administrative privileges, and move to the key vulnerable components. The lateral
movement characterization should include descriptions of its function and the operational
environment in which it operates. The ten most popular administrative tools for lateral
movement are provided by Table 4 (Lightcyber, 2016).

Table 3 Reconnaissance – Top Ten Networking and Hacking Tools
Tool Name

Function

Percentage of Top 10

Angry IP Scanner
PingInfoView

IP address and port scanner
Program that pings multiple hosts at
once
Network discovery and security
auditing tool
Ping command program
A tool that extracts plain text
passwords stored in Windows
High-speed network authentication
cracker
Scripting tool that can be used to script
hacking and reconnaissance tasks
A tool that manages Windows logon
sessions and credentials; can be used to
perform “Pass-the-Hash” attacks
Network packet sniffer
An app that generates malicious PDF
files that can infect vulnerable PDF
applications

27.08%
25.00%

Nmap
Ping
Mimikatz
NCrack
Perl
Windows Credential
Editor
SmartSniff
PDF Exploit Generator

14.58%
12.50%
6.25%
4.17%
4.17%
2.08%

2.08%
2.08%

In addition, remote desktop tools are used to move laterally within a network and to
remotely control elements. Legitimate Information Technology administrators use them and
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cyber weapons can utilize them to control elements that have been compromised. The ten most
popular remote desktop tools for lateral movement are provided by Table 5 (Lightcyber, 2016).

Table 4 Lateral Movement – Top Ten Administrative Tools
Tool Name

Function

Percentage of Top 10

SecureCRT
Putty
BeyondExec Remote
Service
VMWare vSphere
Client
MobaXterm

SecureShell (SSH) and Telnet client
SSH and Telnet client
Utility to spawn processes and
shutdown remote workstations
Management utility for VMware
vSphere Server Virtualization
Xserver and tabbed SSH client for
Windows
Light-weight telnet replacement for
executing processes on remote systems
Task automation and configuration
management framework
SSH client
Telnet client
Terminal emulator that supports SSH,
SFTP, telnet, rlogin and serial access

28.48%
25.95%
10.13%

PsExec
PowerShell
Private Shell SSH
Telnet
Xshell

8.86%
8.23%
8.23%
5.70%
1.90%
1.90%
0.63%

Table 5 Lateral Movement -- Top Ten Remote Desktop Tools
Tool Name

Function

Percentage of Top 10

TeamViewer

Cloud-based or locally hosted remote desktop
and web conferencing software; can be used for
command and control and lateral movement
Remote desktop software using Virtual
Network Computing (VNC) for remote access
Remote desktop and technical support software
Remote desktop software
Cloud-based remote access and remote desktop
service
Cloud-based or locally hosted secure remote
access
Free remote desktop and remote control
software
Application used to access Citrix XenDesktop
and XenApp programs
Microsoft’s native remote desktop solution

37.22%

Remote desktop software that also includes file
transfer and chat messaging

0.34%

WinVNC
Radmin
AnyDesk
LogMeIn
NetOp Remote
Control
Ammyy Adminn
Citrix Client
Remote Desktop
Connection
UltraVNC

27.44%
9.09%
6.86%
4.12%
2.92%
1.72%
0.86%
0.69%
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In addition to the reconnaissance and lateral movement functions, a cyber weapon must
deploy a payload. Payload refers to the component of a computer code that executes an activity
that is unwanted by the targeted system. This does not include the reconnaissance and lateral
movement code required to get the payload packet to its destination. Some example effects of
payloads are data manipulation or destruction, interrupted or inconsistent messages, and the
delivery of spam emails through an infected user's account. Payloads can be developed by black
hat hackers and by government operatives.
The payload characterization should include descriptions of its function and the
operational environment in which it operates. For example, the characterization should indicate
that it exfiltrates data from computers that utilize the Windows 10 operating system.

Cyber Lethality/Effectiveness Estimate Generation
The lethality/effectiveness estimate is the point in the process where the analyst predicts
component response to the weapon. Determining Probability of Kill (PK) or another lethality
metric is the final piece of the system effectiveness process. For a kinetic weapon system, PK is
often part of the system requirements. It is also used by logisticians to determine weapon loadout and by mission planners to develop tactics. Even though there are not production line or
storage magazine concerns relating to cyber weapons, mission planners and combatant
commanders will be critically concerned about the effectiveness of the weapon when it is
deployed. Commanders must have confidence in weapons before using them. This is especially
true when physical damage may not be evident as confirmation.
An effectiveness equation for a typical missile intercept event was illustrated in Figure 6.
In that model it is clear that the majority of the uncertainty, and the associated probabilities,

32
occur after the engagement begins. Similar kill chain models for cyber engagements have been
developed by Lockheed Martin and Mandiant (now FireEye) for an advanced persistent threat
(APT) attack. Figure 9 shows the similarities between these models (Holmes, 2015). In both of
them there are distinct stages of the engagement. The duration of these stages are much longer
than the stages of a kinetic engagement. In addition, the pre-compromise stage where
reconnaissance occurs is actually prior to the engagement start; that is, prior to when the
commander wants to engage the cyber weapon.

Figure 9 Cyber Kill Chain Models

Since these APT attack phases are well defined and understood by the cyber community,
these have been selected to form the basis for an initial cyber effectiveness relationship. As in
the case of the kinetic effectiveness equation, cyber effectiveness is calculated by multiplying the
probability of various contributors. The most significant difference between the kinetic and the
cyber effectiveness models is the cyber weapon payload probability of success can likely be
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considered equal to one. It has been tested and proven in a lab setting to perform the action
necessary to achieve the desired kill effect. However, the other events leading up to the payload
activation have differing uncertainties.
In order to add meaning to the kill chain, it is necessary to associate probabilities with
each of these steps: Intelligence (Reconnaissance), Delivery, and Exploitation.
Thus, the cyber equivalent to the kinetic equation in Figure 6 can be shown as the
following relationship:
Pk = f(PIntel * PDeliv * PExploit) where
•

PIntel is dependent upon the probabilities of the knowledge of access points, hardware
and software configurations, completeness of network map, understanding of
operations tempo, and the latency (or timeliness) of information (PIntel = f(PAccess *
PConfig * PMap * PTempo * PLatent)),

•

PDeliv is dependent upon the likelihood of a patch to address software vulnerabilities
being implemented and IT’s ability to detect and respond to the delivery (PDeliv

=

f(PPatch * PIT)), and
•

PExploit = is the likelihood that the payload will achieve the desired mission effects.

Note that PDeliv is actually a product of the survival rule for PPatch and PIT because a poor
response by the defending asset gives a greater likelihood of success by the attacker. Also, other
factors may also be included in the PIntel and PDeliv terms. Some of these uncertainty factors
include the likelihood of knowing the password or having the proper credentials, the chance that
a hardware upgrade has occurred, the impact of network congestion on the timing of the attack,
and even if the proper node has been targeted. A cyber reconnaissance tool may be required to
ascertain all the appropriate factors and to quantify their impacts on the likelihood of success.
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The reconnaissance tool may also be necessary to confirm that the correct element has been
targeted. Figure 10 shows the resulting cyber effectiveness relationship for a path through an
example network.

Figure 10 Cyber System Effectiveness Kill Chain

Upon completion of the cyber lethality/effectiveness evaluation, the information must be
documented for the user. This is done by creating a Cyber JMEM for the product. Remember
that the JMEM information includes damage/kill probabilities for specific weapons and threats,
physical and functional characteristics of munitions and weapon systems, threat vulnerability,
obscuration on weapon effectiveness, and analytical techniques and procedures for assessing
munitions effectiveness. In the case of a Cyber JMEM, the weapon must be described in terms
of an exploit – a means by which the attacker uses a vulnerability to cause damage to the target
system. The Cyber JMEM will provide the commander with the necessary information to
choose the most appropriate attack means to achieve his or her operational mission.
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The commander makes this decision through the process outlined in Joint Publication
3-60, Joint Targeting. Targeting is a systematic process which enables the commander to
analyze and prioritize targets and then match appropriate lethal and non-lethal actions to those
targets to achieve specific desired effects. Targeting links the desired effects to actions and tasks
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). The Joint Targeting process is illustrated in Figure 11.

End State and
Commander’s
Objectives

Goal Definition
Assessment

Target
Development and
Prioritization

Mission Success Evaluation

Select Target to
Achieve Goal

Mission
Planning and
Force Execution

Engagement
Scenario Planning
Best Means to
Cause Effect

Capabilities
Analysis

Approval Decision
Commander’s
Decision and Force
Assignment

Figure 11 Joint Targeting Cycle

For engagements implemented with kinetic weapons, there is significant data and
accredited models available to estimate system performance. Threat models, or approved
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surrogates, exist to allow for the selection and prioritization of targets. Performance models can
readily predict performance of specific weapons against those targets. The results of these are
summarized in JMEM documents. In order for cyber weapons to be considered as a viable
capability, an equivalent level of maturity must be obtained. That is, target models must be
created and verified, weapon characteristics must be standardized and thorough, and
performance models must be developed and accredited so that the operational forces will trust
the findings. The Cyber JMEM will encapsulate this information for the commander.

3.5 Follow-on Tasks and Research
The methodology proposed here is intended to support the tri-service cyber teams and
mission planners. An operationally relevant cyberspace lethality and effectiveness tool is an
unmet need of the cyber community. Ultimately, a fielded cyber JMEM tool that incorporates
accredited cyberspace quantitative and qualitative models, effectiveness data on cyberspace
delivered effects/associated risks, and potential collateral consequences of employing cyberspace
effects mechanisms is desired. The proposed methodology is a first-cut attempt to conduct a
cyberspace vulnerability characterization and a cyber weapon lethality assessment. But it
cannot be implemented without additional work and without the cooperation of the other
JTCG/ME and U.S. Cyber Command activities.
Aspects of this proposal were presented to the JTCG/ME through existing contacts via
the NSWCDD Lethality and Effectiveness Branch. A JTCG/ME Joint Non-Kinetic Effects
Configuration Control Board (CCB) exists to consider these types of issues. The methodology
was discussed by the CCB and has formed the basis for future efforts.
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The first task – create data standards for the target, weapon, and network models – has
been initiated. With these, the practitioners at U.S. Cyber Command can be engaged to help
finalize the standard formats and content for the cyber target vulnerability model and the cyber
weapon characterization. The formats must be acceptable so that they become adopted across
the community. The cyber target vulnerability model can, based upon experience, be modified
to reflect changes to the cyber domain and the types and characteristics of potential targets. The
cyber weapon characterization is critical information for the cyber JMEM product. Ongoing
dialogue is necessary and expected to develop these formats. Cyber target and weapon data
requirements will be gathered through discussions with various types of government and
academic personnel including: basic research individuals, weapon system developers, analysts,
system modelers, intelligence analysts, vulnerability experts, and weapon system program
managers. The analysis must consider the scope, level, and duration necessary to construct
target models and cyber payloads that encompass the physical, functional, or behavioral state
changes typically associated with mission and damage criterion of the target. Standard business
tools such as surveys and working groups will be used to develop a consensus. The products will
be qualitative in nature since there is no numeric value that can be associated with a template.
Clearly, the effectiveness relationship for cyber operations also needs to be reviewed,
critiqued, investigated, and improved. The initial proposal needs to be examined by the cyber
professionals and they must be presented with the opportunity to refine the variables. Therefore,
the second research task will determine the factors and numeric contributions of the cyber
effectiveness kill chain factors. This will require the creation of test standards and the collection
of appropriate data to build quantitative assessment values. Test and evaluation requirements
will be gathered through discussions with government and academic personnel. The proposed
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cyber relationship will be presented to the cyber teams for their critique. Feedback will be used
to modify the relationship with the intent to eventually formulate a cyber effectiveness equation.
Most importantly, the terms and values associated with the relationship contributors will be
adopted. Test data will then be gathered and analyzed to determine confidence values or bins.
The goal is to create a standard by which required organizations can adequately and succinctly
capture the performance of a cyberspace capability and its unique configuration against a target
and its unique attributes.
It is the author’s belief that value of the weaponization element of the effectiveness
relationship (PExploit) should be one since testing can be concentrated and extensive. It is up to
the test community to prove this to be true by demonstrating that tests and test reports cover all
criteria. This will give the combatant commanders confidence that the cyber payload will
achieve the desired mission effects. This will have the subsequent effect of increasing the
commander’s confidence that cyber is a viable option so that more than just kinetic weapons will
be considered part of the available arsenal.
These research tasks have either begun or should be initiated this fall with the anticipated
completion by the end of September, 2018. This will allow the DoD cyber community ample
time to implement the standards in Fiscal Year 2019 and beyond.
A larger research area that is beyond the scope of this paper pertains to the effectiveness
model for cyber operations in support of information operations information-related influence
efforts. These are efforts that attempt to inform, influence, and persuade others to change their
behavior or attitudes. They are often directed at the strategic level, but there are situations where
they are necessary at the operational area. The effectiveness of cyber operations to influence the
attitudes and behavior at hard-to-reach or challenging audiences needs to be researched. This
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type of assessment goes beyond altering computer commands and, thus, the value for PExploit is
likely to be less than one. A thoughtful evaluation of identifying objectives and measuring
progress toward those objectives must be completed and the results folded back into the cyber
effectiveness relationship.
While it is being completed and implemented, it will be important that NSWCDD and the
other organizations that support the JTCG/ME develop a workforce that is suited to evaluating
cyber weapons. It is recommended that knowledge, skills, and abilities criteria be established
and the workforce be trained to achieve them. Existing commercially available training should
be evaluated to determine its applicability. If it is found to be lacking, specialized training
should be procured. It may be possible to coordinate with the other Services to create a
schoolhouse for analysts and operators. Defining the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities
may be the subject of follow-on research.
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CHAPTER 4
4. RESULTS
Progress has begun on the tasks outlined in this proposal but there is much more to
accomplish. This will require continued collaboration between various activities.

4.1 Proposal Acceptance
As indicated, the proposal has been adopted by the JTCG/ME. The Joint Non-Kinetic
Effects CCB has adopted the structure of this proposal as the basis for the cyber JMEM
development effort. Tasks have been initiated to define data standards to define the weapon
characterization, the target vulnerability characterization, and the operational environment
characterization. These tasks are being led by different groups within the JTCG/ME. The
products will be reviewed and, if satisfactory, adopted by the CCB.
The author, on behalf of the CCB, also presented the concept to the JTCG/ME Steering
Committee in late spring, 2017. The Steering Committee reviews and approves task proposals
on a fiscal year basis. The Steering Committee noted that there is much work to be done but
agreed to the overall process. Some members of the Steering Committee, in particular, noted
that this work must be done in a close relationship with the U.S. Cyber Command and its cyber
mission teams.
The Steering Committee met again in early November to approve tasks for Fiscal Year
2018. Approval of the cyber tasks outlined by the Joint Non-Kinetic Effects CCB is considered
to be confirmation of the soundness of the proposal by an independent body. On 26 October, the
chair of the Steering Committee was briefed in advance of the meeting. She indicated that she
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understands the basis for the proposal and would like to be kept well-informed of the progress.
The full Steering Committee subsequently approved the cyber tasks as proposed.

4.2 Engaging U.S. Cyber Command
In accordance with the consensus of the JTCG/ME Steering Committee, the first task of
this proposal requires engagement and collaboration with U.S. Cyber Command. Initial efforts
have begun to standardize the cyber lethality data standards. With funding in FY18, operational
user group meetings will be conducted with participants from the cyber combat mission teams.
These teams are being established to provide support to Combatant Commands by generating
integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2017). Their purpose is to achieve military and security objectives with
precision such that there is minimal loss of life and property.
Since not all commands will be able to attend simultaneously, multiple operational user
group meetings will be held. They will be conducted at various commands to reduce the travel
and time demands on the operators. The developers and operators will be surveyed to determine
how they currently document weapon characteristics, targets, and the operational environment.
The initial draft standards will be discussed and recommendations taken to improve them.
Minutes will be taken and the results will be incorporated into later versions of the data
standards.
Operational user groups will also be utilized to help determine cyber kill definitions. The
cyber mission teams will each likely have a particular area of focus and expertise. So, in
addition to achieving a consensus on the data standards, it will be important to understand the
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different kinds of effects they intend to implement. This will drive the cyber-specific kill effects
and definitions.
Test results from the mission cyber teams and other activities will be evaluated to
confirm the hypothesis that the probability that a particular cyber weapon works against a target
is either one or zero. Other uncertainty metrics, however, will remain to be evaluated. The
operational user groups will be used to determine the criteria that make up the PIntel, PDeliv, and
PExploit terms. The probabilities associated with each of these will likely be determined by the
Intelligence Community.
This task will be considered successfully achieved if upgraded data standards are
finalized by the end of September 2018, initial uncertainty metrics are compiled, and the test data
confirms or refutes the hypothesis that a well-defined cyber weapon can be considered to have a
probability of one against particular targets.
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CHAPTER 5
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary
This dissertation describes the lethality prediction processes for kinetic and directed
energy weapons and outlines the research necessary to develop a methodology to implement a
cyber weapon lethality process. It is noted that cyber mechanisms can induce different kinds of
effects and can be reversible. Cyber targets and environments are also likely to be more dynamic
than traditional military targets. Therefore the existing kinetic processes must be tailored to
account for the different timelines necessary to design and engage cyber targets. Since the armed
forces understand and utilize the JTCG/ME process for kinetic weapons, the cyber methodology
will mirror that process as applicable.
The current cyber JMEM development effort being undertaken by the JTCG/ME is
utilizing this methodology. The concept was presented to the JTCG/ME Steering Committee in
the late spring and the proposed tasks for Fiscal Year 2018 are meant to implement it. The
Steering Committee met in early November and approved the cyber tasks for Fiscal Year 2018.

5.2 Recommendation
The cyber lethality methodology will be developed over the next several years. During
that time, additional studies and efforts are recommended.
In order to ensure that all parties describe the weapons, targets, and networks
consistently, the JTCG/ME must collaborate with U.S. Cyber Command, the cyber mission
teams, and the cyber test community to confirm that the data standards are accurate and
implementable. Likewise, to most efficiently develop the cyber effectiveness equation, the same
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collaborative effort must be utilized to review, critique, and refine the variables that will
comprise it. User groups will allow all parties to provide their recommendations and
explanations.
Kinetic weapons operate solely in the physical domain. As shown in Figure 1,
cyberspace encompasses three layers: the physical network layer, the logical network layer, and
the cyber-persona layer. An additional academic study may investigate the cyber lethality
nuances associated with the various cyber layers. There may be different factors associated with
each cyberspace layer. This study may provide insights into the fault trees associated with the
layers and potential collateral effects. The temporal relationships of cyber-personas may also
result in corrections or corollaries to the cyber lethality relationship equation.
Physics-based models exist that allow analysts to predict the performance of kinetic and
directed energy weapons. The same spectrum of tools does not exist for cyber evaluations. An
academic study of the available cyber ranges and tools would be beneficial to the community by
recognizing the state-of-the-art methodologies and identifying gaps in the community’s
simulation capabilities.
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